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SHELDON V. FETTIG: INTERPRETING THE
SUBSTITUTE SERVICE OF PROCESS
STATUTE IN WASHINGTON
Dana Richardson
Abstract: In Sheldon v. Fettig, the Washington Supreme Court announced a new rule for
interpreting Washington's substitute service of process statute. This new rule calls for a
liberal reading of the substitute service of process statute to better effect its legislative
purpose, thus overruling the line of cases calling for strict construction of the substitute
service of process statute. This Note analyzes the basis of the former rule, the Sheldon rule,
and the Sheldon dissent's proposed rule. It concludes that the former rule of interpretation
should be retained because it preserves canons of strict construction and better protects
defendants' due process rights.
The obligation to provide a litigant with notice of impending actions
is part of the limitation imposed by constitutional due process on a
court's ability to exercise jurisdiction.' Like other state legislatures, the
Washington Legislature has enacted a service of process statute defining
a procedure to provide defendants with notice. Revised Code of
Washington section 4.28.080(15) provides that "[t]he summons shall be
served by delivering a copy thereof.., to the defendant personally, or
by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his usual abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein."2
Delivery of a summons and complaint directly to a defendant is
considered personal service while delivery of a summons and complaint
to someone else, on behalf of a defendant, is commonly considered
substitute service.3
1. See, e.g., Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 151, 812 P.2d 858, 859 (1991) ("The
purpose of statutes which prescribe the methods of service of process is to provide due process.
'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.'... That
opportunity to be heard in turn depends upon notice that a suit is being commenced.") (quoting
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); William R. Trail & Julia A. Beck, Peralta v. Heights Medical
Center, Inc.: A Void Judgment is a Void Judgment is a Void Judgment-Bill of Review and
Procedural Due Process in Texas, 40 Baylor L. Rev. 365,365 (1988).
2. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.080(15) (1988). Aside from Revised Code of Washington section
4.28.080, a number of other Washington statues also contain provisions for service of process. See,
e.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.58.460 (1982), 34.05.542(2) (1990) (Administrative Procedure Act);
46.64.040 (1987) (nonresident motorist statute), 51.52.110 (1990) (Industrial Insurance Act).
Unless otherwise indicated, service of process will refer to service under Revised Code of
Washington § 4.28.080(15).
3. See Milton D. Green, Basic Civil Procedure 43 (1972).
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In Sheldon v. Fettig,4 the Washington Supreme Court announced that
the substitute service of process statute should be liberally construed to
effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction of the court.5 This decision
changed the former rule that substitute service of process statutes should
be strictly construed.6 This Note focuses on the court's new rule of
liberal interpretation of the substitute service of process statute. Part I
reviews the rule of strict construction in place before the Sheldon
decision, discussing that rule's reliance on statutory canons of strict
construction and the basis of the former rule in procedural due process.
Part II discusses the Sheldon rule of interpretation, its premise of
ascertaining the Legislature's purpose, and its reference to Washington's
general interpretive statute. Part II also considers the rule proposed by
Justice Talmadge's dissent in Sheldon, requiring strict compliance with
the service of process statute to gain original jurisdiction, but only
substantial compliance to acquire appellate jurisdiction. Part III
critically evaluates the Sheldon rule. This Note concludes by proposing a
rule for a more equitable interpretation of the service of process statute.
I. SUBSTITUTE SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTES WERE
STRICTLY CONSTRUED BEFORE SHELDON
The Sheldon decision repudiated the former rule requiring strict
construction of substitute service of process statutes Despite some
deviations,' it was generally accepted before Sheldon that substitute
service statutes were to be strictly construed. The cases requiring strict
construction of substitute service of process statutes were based on
4. 129 Wash. 2d 601,919 P.2d 1209 (1996).
5. Id. at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212.
6. Ia at 607, 919 P.2d at 1211. See Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash. 2d 36, 38, 360 P.2d
744, 745 (1961), for a statement of the former rule.
7. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 368, 83 P.2d 221,
226 (1938) (holding substitute service of process insufficient when made upon defendants'
daughter-in-law who was visiting hotel room that defendants temporarily occupied); Dolan v.
Baldridge, 165 Wash. 69, 75, 4 P.2d 871, 873 (1931) (holding substitute service of process
insufficient when served upon defendant's wife who had only returned to forr.er residence to pack
and ship household items).
8. See, e.g., City of Spokane v. Department of Labor & Indus. (In re Saltis), 94 Wash. 2d 889,
897, 621 P.2d 716, 720 (1980) (holding that constructive service under APA need only
substantially comply with terms of statute); Lee v. Barnes, 58 Wash. 2d 265, :362 P.2d 237 (1961)
(concluding that parties could agree upon method of service that was not in statute but would, in all
probability, result in actual service).
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canons for interpreting statutes in conjunction with common law and the
concern that procedural due process rights of litigants be guarded.9
A. Interpreting Statutes in Conjunction with the Common Law
Washington courts have often relied on the canon that statutes in
derogation of common law should be strictly construed."0 Washington
courts have specifically applied the canon to service of process cases."
One of the first cases to adopt and explain the canon was State v.
Binnard,12 in which the court stated:
[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law . . . are construed
strictly, not operating beyond their words, or the clear repugnance
of their provisions; that is, the new displaces the old only as
directly and irreconcilably opposed in terms. For when the
legislative power professes to add to the law, as it does in the
enactment of an affirmative statute, we cannot assume for it an
intention also to subtract from it, while there is any admissible rule
of interpretation which, applied to the old, to the new, or to both,
will enable all to stand. 3
Madden v. Public Utilities District No. P4 outlined additional rules
for interpreting statutes in conjunction with common law. The Madden
court stated that, as a general matter, there is no legal interest in
common law or statutory law remaining the same over time. 5 The court
further explained that a statute plainly designed as a substitute for the
common law must be given effect and that, when the statute and
common law were so repugnant that both could not be given effect, the
terms of the statute control. 6
9. See, e.g., Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash. 2d 36, 360 P.2d 744 (1961) (finding that
substitute and constructive service statutes, enacted to protect due process rights, were in
derogation of common law and should be strictly construed).
10. See, for example, McKeandv. Bird, 116 Wash. 208, 211, 199 P, 293, 294 (1921) and cases
cited therein.
11. See, e.g., Muncie, 58 Wash. 2d at 38, 360 P.2d at 745; State ex rel. Hoprnan v. Superior
Court, 88 Wash. 612, 153 P. 315 (1915); Dubois v. Kapuni, 71 Wash. App. 621, 860 P.2d 431
(1993); In re Estate of Palucci, 61 Wash. App. 412, 810 P.2d 970 (1991).
12. 21 Wash. 349, 58 P. 210 (1889).
13. Id at 353,58 P. at211.
14. 83 Wash. 2d219, 517 P.2d 585 (1973).
15. Id. at 221-22, 517 P.2d at 587.
16. Id.
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In the recent Wichert v. Cardwell17 decision, the Washington Supreme
Court, in dicta, called into question the use of this canon of strict
construction. 8 In Wichert, the court cited conflicting precedent on the
canon of strict construction 9 and concluded that strict construction did
not require the court to construe the substitute service of process statute
itself strictly.2" Rather, strict construction merely required the court to
read the statute closely to ascertain whether the statute was intended to
change the common law.2' According to this analysis, the court began
with the assumption that common law required personal service and
only personal service. A close reading of the statute indicated that the
Legislature intended to change the common law by allowing substitute
service. Then, based upon the conclusion that the statute itself need not
be construed strictly, the court read the statute to give effect to its spirit
and purpose.'
17. 117 Wash. 2d 148, 812 P.2d 858 (1991). The issue in Wichert was the meaning of the phrase
"then resident therein" in the substitute service of process statute. Id at 150, 812 P.2d at 859. The
court initially explained that use of the canon regarding statutes in derogation of common law
should begin with identification of the common law rule according to Revised Code of Washington
section 4.04.010, which states: "The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor ir compatible with the
institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this
state." Wash. Rev. Code § 4.04.010 (1988). A court should then consider whether the statute is in
derogation of the common law rule keeping in mind that the code, in general, must be liberally
construed under Revised Code of Washington section 1.12.010. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 154, 812
P.2d at 861. The court held that leaving service with the daughter of the defendants who had stayed
overnight at the defendants' house satisfied the statute even though the daughter was not "then
resident therein." Id. at 152, 812 P.2d at 860.
18. See Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 153-55, 812 P.2d 860-61 (citing 3 Frnk E. Horack, Jr.,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.04 (4th ed. 1986) (stating that canon has been criticized as,
among other things, mere justification for decisions reached on other grounds); 3 Roscoe Pound,
Jurisprudence 664 (1949); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts,
64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 852 (1964)).
19. See id. at 154-55, 812 P.2d at 861 (citing McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285
(1980) (indicating that statute pertaining to commencement of personal injury actions itself should
be strictly construed and that statute should be examined closely to determine whether legislature
intended to change common law); Madden, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 517 P.2d 585 (indicating that plain
and unambiguous statute should be read in light of its obvious meaning regardless of common law
rule)). The court approvingly cited a Minnesota case, Teders v. Rothermel, 286 N.W. 353 (Minn.
1939), for the proposition that a court should always effect the purpose of the legislature despite
any departure from the common law rule. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 155, 812 P.2d at 861.
20. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 154-56, 812 P.2d at 861-62.
21. See id. at 154, 812 P.2d at 861.
22. See id at 156, 812 P.2d at 862.
Sheldon v. Fettig
B. The Service ofProcess Statute Was Based on Protecting
Procedural Due Process Rights
Washington courts have incorporated the U.S. Supreme Court's
standard for reviewing adequacy of summons procedures to protect
defendants' procedural due process rights.' The general standard for
service of process was established by the landmark U.S. Supreme Court
decision Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.:24 "The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."'2 The Washington
Supreme Court explained the Mullane standard of procedural due
process in Olympic Forest Products, Inc. v. Chaussee Corp.26 The
Chaussee court determined that the boundaries of due process could not
be specifically delineated but that adequate protection of defendants'
due process rights required, at a minimum, the opportunity to be heard
and notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of any
pending action." To ensure this result, Washington courts have required
that service of process comply with the terms of the pertinent statute as
well as constitutional due process.28
II. SHELDON V FETTIG
A. Background of the Case
1. Facts
In Sheldon v. Fettig,29 the plaintiff attempted service by leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint with the defendant's brother at the
defendant's parents' house in Seattle.' The court identified a number of
factors indicating that the defendant resided in Seattle. Specifically, the
23. Compare Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002
(1973) (discussing balance between state's interest and individual's right to be heard in
garnishment case) with In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982) (explicitly adopting
U.S. Supreme Court's due process balancing test when determining sufficiency of summons).
24. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
25. R at 315.
26. 82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973).
27. l t at422, 511 P.2d at 1005.
28. See, e.g., Thayer v. Edmonds, 8 Wash. App. 36, 503 P.2d 1110 (1972) (reasoning that
service of process was not proper unless due process and statutory requirements were met).
29. 129 Wash. 2d 601, 919 P.2d 1209 (1996).
30. See id at 604, 919 P.2d at 1210.
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court noted that for at least seven weeks after relocating to Chicago to
begin a flight-attendant training program, the defendant's parents'
address was listed to receive forwarded mail. The defendant's voter
registration, vehicle registration, and car insurance listed her parents'
Seattle address. The defendant never acquired an Illinois driving license
nor did she register to vote in Illinois. The defendant maintained a
savings account in Seattle and also left personal belongings at her
parents' residence.3'
The court identified other factors indicating that the defendant had
established a residence in Chicago. The court noted particularly that,
upon completion of the training program, the defendant signed a lease
for a Chicago residence, opened a checking account, joined a health
club, and had her mail forwarded to her Chicago address. Although the
defendant visited Seattle frequently after her move,32 she did not have
her own room at her parents' Seattle home, preferring usually to sleep at
her boyfriend's house next door.33
2. The Majority's Holding and Reasoning
The defendant challenged the sufficiency of service of process
arguing that her parents' Seattle residence was not her "house of usual
abode" as required by statute.34 In response, the court held that, under
appropriate circumstances, 35 a defendant could maintain more than one
house of usual abode.36 Under this liberal reading of the statute, the court
upheld the service of process.
The court began its analysis of the case by acknowledging that the
substitute service statute had been strictly interpreted in the past37 but
31. See id. at 604-05, 919 P.2d at 1210.
32. Defendant's father estimated that she was in Seattle four to six days each month. See id. at
605, 919 P.2d at 1210.
33. See id. at 604-05, 919 P.2d at 1210.
34. Seeid. at 606, 919 P.2d at 1211.
35. See id. at 612, 919 P.2d at 1214 (noting that if each house was center of domestic activity
where defendant would likely receive prompt notice, then service of process would be proper at
either location).
36. See id. The definition of "house of usual abode" is beyond the sco-?e of this Note. For
comments on that topic see 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1096 (1st ed. 1969) and Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Construction of Phrase "Usual
Place ofAbode, " or Similar Terms Referring to Abode, Residence, or Domicile as Used in Statutes
Relating to Service of Process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112 (1970).
37. Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d at 607, 919 P.2d at 1211 (citing Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58
Wash. 2d 36, 360 P.2d 744 (1961)).
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noted that there was a recent trend to interpret the statute liberally to
effectuate the spirit and intent of the statute." In support of liberal
interpretation, the court cited cases from other jurisdictions that had
interpreted substitute service statutes liberally when the defendant
actually received notice as, presumably, defendant had in this case. The
court found further support for its rule of liberal interpretation in
Revised Code of Washington section 1.12.010, which prescribes liberal
construction of code provisions,' and Civil Rule 1, which promotes the
policy to decide cases on their merits rather than dismissing them on
technicalities.4" The court concluded by summarily pronouncing that the
rule of liberal construction exceeded constitutional due process
requirements.42
B. The Majority's Rule Requiring Liberal Interpretation of the
Substitute Service ofProcess Statute
The Sheldon court's liberal reading of the substitute service of
process statute departed from precedent. The court used two rationales
to support its switch to a liberal interpretation. First, the court stated that
a liberal reading facilitated the court's efforts to give effect to the
purpose of the statute.43 Second, the court noted that a liberal reading of
the service of process statute was consistent with section 1.12.0 10 of the
Revised Code of Washington calling for liberal construction of the
Code's provisions.'
38. See id. at 607-08, 919 P.2d at 1211-12 (citing Martin v. Triol, 121 Wash. 2d 135, 847 P.2d
471 (1993); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 812 P.2d 858 (1991); Martin v. Meier, 111
Wash. 2d 471,760 P.2d 925 (1988)).
39. See id at 608-09, 919 P.2d at 1212 (citing Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.
1963); Plonski v. Halloran, 420 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1980); Larson v. Hendrickson, 394 N.W.2d 524
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
40. See id at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212. Revised Code of Washington section 1.12.010 states, "The
provisions of this code shall be liberally construed, and shall not be limited by any rule of strict
construction." Wash. Rev. Code § 1.12.010 (1988) (originally enacted as An act to regulate the
practice and proceedings in civil actions, § 504, 1854 Wash. Laws 221).
41. Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212. Civil Rule 1 states, "[The rules] shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Wash. Civ. R
1.
42. Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212.
43. See id at 607, 919 P.2d at 1211.
44. See id at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 1.12.010).
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1. Interpreting the Substitute Service ofProcess Statute According to
Its Purpose
Washington courts have developed a set of statutor interpretation
rules that reflect a belief that the judiciary should interpret statutes to
effect the Legislature's purpose.4" Two of those rules were stated in
Wichert: "(1) the spirit and intent of the statute should prevail over the
literal letter of the law and (2) there should be made that interpretation
which best advances the perceived legislative purpose."'  In Graffel v.
Honeysuckle,47 the Washington Supreme Court cited two additional rules
of statutory interpretation. One was that the prim xy source for
determining legislative intent was the statute, its context, and its subject
matter.48 Second, the court presumed that an amendment to the wording
of a statute indicated a change in the purpose of that statute.49
Applying the above guidelines, Washington courts have identified
several purposes of the substitute service of process statute. The Sheldon
court specified that the purposes of the substitute service of process
statute were to act as a mechanism to fulfill due process and to provide
defendants with service reasonably calculated to accomplish notice."
The court also stated that the statute was intended to provide plaintiffs a
reasonable means to serve defendants.5 In addition, an earlier case noted
that the substitute service of process statute was intended to ensure the
best service possible under the circumstances. 2
45. See, e.g., Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wash. 2d 815, 664 P.2d 1227 (1983) (stating that it is
court's duty to ascertain and give effect to legislative purpose).
46. Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 151, 812 P.2d 858, 859 (1991) (citing Bennett v.
Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990); In re R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982)).
The process of ascertaining the legislature's original purpose and interpreting a statute to further
the purpose of the legislature has been supported on at least three grounds: (1) legislatures are
vested with the exclusive power to create law and courts only role is to carry out the legislature's
intent; (2) statutes are contracts between interest groups and the legislature and should be enforced
according to their original terms and purpose; and (3) judges abuse their powrr when they expand
upon the original meaning of statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1481 (1987).
47. 30 Wash. 2d 390, 191 P.2d 858 (1948).
48. See id. at 399, 191 P.2d at 863; see also Grant, 99 Wash. 2d at 813, 664 P.2d at 1230
(finding that court must give effect to intent and purpose of legislature as e:pressed in statutes);
Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Board ofMed. Exam'rs, 93 Wash. 2d 117, 605 P.2d 1269 (1980)
(observing that statute's purpose may be discovered through historical context and examination of
problem statute was intended to solve).
49. Graffel, 30 Wash. 2d at 399, 191 P.2d at 863.
50. Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wash. 2d 601,609, 919 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1996).
51. See id. at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212-13 (citing Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 312 P.2d 858).
52. See Northwestern & Pac. Hypotheek Bank v. Ridpath, 29 Wash. 687, 70 P. 139 (1902).
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2. The Liberal Construction Statute
The Sheldon majority based its holding on a liberal interpretation of
the substitute service of process statute. The court declared that its rule
of interpretation was consistent with Revised Code of Washington
section 1.12.010, which calls for liberal construction of code
provisions. 3 In Wichert, the Washington Supreme Court commented in
dicta that Revised Code of Washington section 1.12.010 arguably
applied to the service of process statute.54
C. Justice Talmadge 's Dissent and Proposed Rule
Justice Talmadge's dissent in Sheldon differed with the majority's
opinion on three separate grounds. First, he argued that the majority's
conclusion that a defendant could have more than one house of usual
abode contradicted the plain language of the statute." Second, Justice
Talmadge challenged the majority's factual conclusions.56 Third, Justice
Talmadge faulted the majority for disregarding two recent cases that
required strict compliance with the service of process statute,57 and two
earlier cases in which "house of usual abode" was construed as the place
where the defendant was actually living at the time of service.58 This
failure to follow precedent reinforced Justice Talmadge's concern over
the inconsistency of the court's service of process decisions.5 9 He
concluded:
53. Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d at 609, 919 P.2d at 1212.
54. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 154,812 P.2d at 861.
55. Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d at 617, 919 P.2d at 1216 (1996) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
56. The dissent found that the defendant was only an occasional visitor in her parents' home and
that she was, in fact, living in Chicago. Id at 619, 919 P.2d at 1217 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
Also, the defendant's use of her parents' address for her driver's license and voting registration did
not make her parents' home her usual abode. See id (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 613-14, 919 P.2d at 1214-15 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing Union Bay
Preservation Coalition v. Cosmos Dev. & Admin. Corp., 127 Wash. 2d 614, 902 P.2d 1247 (1995)
(requiring strict compliance with APA and its provisions regarding service on parties and not their
attorneys of record); Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wash. 2d 726, 903 P.2d 455 (1995) (invalidating service
left on window sill just outside where defendant sat)).
58. See id. at 616-17, 919 P.2d at 1215-16 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing Dolan v.
Baldridge, 165 Wash. 79, 4 P.2d 871 (1931) (disallowing service upon defendant's wife while she
returned to their former residence to pack and ship belongings); Lepeska v. Farley, 67 Wash. App.
548, 833 P.2d 437 (1992) (denying jurisdiction over defendant who was served at his mother's
house while defendant maintained separate residence)).
59. The dissent stated:
In recent opinions, we have struggled with issues relating to service of process, lurching
between liberal and stringent interpretations of statutes and rules without a firm anchor in
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We serve the trial courts and the practicing bar poorly when we
accept review of service of process cases and decide them as if
they were sui generis, free of precedent and of consistent, guiding
principles. I would decide this case as Washington judges have
always decided such cases, and hold service of process was
insufficient because it was not accomplished in accordance with
RCW 4.28.080(15) where Fettig was actually living, at her "house
of... usual abode."60
In his Sheldon dissent, Justice Talmadge referred to an. earlier opinion
where he had proposed a rule to govern service of process cases6 In that
case, he recommended strict compliance with statutes when acquiring
original jurisdiction, particularly for substitute service rules, and
substantial compliance for matters of continuing and appellate
jurisdiction.62 This rule, he explained, would uphold the constitutional
principles of notice and opportunity to participate fairly in court
proceedings.63 Additionally, Justice Talmadge commented that this rule
would be "simpler" and "more appropriate" than the current rule.'
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SHELDON RULE OF
INTERPRETATION
A. The Sheldon Majority's Analysis According to Legislative Purpose
Is Problematic and Difficult for Courts To Apply
principle. By adopting here a liberal construction of the substituted service of process statute,
the majority injects further confusion into our already chaotic jurisprudence.
Id. at 612, 919 P.2d at 1214 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 621, 919 P.2d at 1218 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
61. See id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing Union Bay, 127 Wash. 2d 614, 902 P.2d 1247
(Talmadge, J., dissenting)). The issue in Union Bay was whether the plaintiff, by serving the
parties' attorneys, had complied with the APA requirements of service on "all parties of record" to
procure appellate jurisdiction. Union Bay, 127 Wash. 2d at 617-18, 902 P.2d at 1249. The court
held that the APA's requirements of service were not fulfilled because the language and history of
the APA excluded service on attorneys; therefore the statute required strict compliance with its
terms. Id at 618-20, 902 P.2d at 1249-51. In the Union Bay dissent, Justice Talmadge argued that,
although "party" was legislatively defined, "parties of record" was not. Id. at 622, 902 P.2d at 1251
(Talmadge, J., dissenting). Because the Legislature had neither defined the key term nor explicitly
repudiated the substantial compliance doctrine, Justice Talmadge found that service of process
substantially complied with the statute and should have been upheld. Id at 618-19, 622-24, 902 P.
2d at 1249-50, 1251-52 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
62. Union Bay, 127 Wash. 2d at 621, 902 P.2d at 1250-51 (1995) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
63. See id at 624, 902 P.2d at 1252 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
64. Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wash. 2d 726, 734, 903 P.2d 455, 459 (1995) (Talmadge, J.,
concurring) (explaining his opinion in Union Bay).
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Although Washington courts uniformly attempt to give effect to the
Legislature's purpose and intent,65 this process is not without its
difficulties. 66 The first difficulty in ascertaining legislative purpose is
that legislatures are collective bodies made up of individuals with
divergent interests. Statutes are not the product of a single legislative
intent. Rather, they are an amalgamation of competing interests that
result in statutory language.67 Washington courts have recognized this
and have held that an individual legislator's statement of intent may not
be imputed to the entire legislature. 6' Although it is not known what
compromises or negotiations went into the writing of the substitute
service of process statute, Washington courts have identified three
legislative purposes behind the statute.69 The several purposes identified
by courts suggest that a unified legislative intent did not underlie the
enactment of the substitute service of process statute.
The Sheldon court and Washington courts in general have tried to
address lack of unified legislative intent by instructing courts to adopt
the interpretation that best effects the legislative purpose. This
instruction, however, does not tell courts how to weigh competing
interests under the substitute service of process statute. As a result,
Washington courts have identified legislative purposes that are in
tension with each other.70 Illustrative of this tension is the problem posed
by students who list their parents' address as their permanent address for
various purposes but never reside at their parents' home. A court must
determine whether a parents' address denotes the place of usual house of
65. See supra Part II.A.I. Although legislative intent and legislative purpose are distinct
concepts, Washington courts have long interchanged their use and relied on the determination of
one for determination of the other. See, e.g., Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 128 Wash. 2d 207,
905 P.2d 379 (1995) (relying on legislative purpose when statute had no statement of legislative
intent); City ofMontesano v. Wells, 79 Wash. App. 529, 902 P.2d 1266 (1995) (stating that to give
effect to legislative intent court should construe statutes in manner that best advances legislative
purpose); McNiece v. Washington State Univ., 73 Wash. App. 801, 871 P.2d 649 (1994) (finding
that legislative intent could be detennined by looking at purpose of statute); Buttelo v. S.A.
Woods-Yates Am. Mach. Co., 72 Wash. App. 397, 401, 864 P.2d 948, 951 (1993) (stating that
"[the Legislature's intent can be determined by reference to the statute's underlying purpose").
66. See, e.g., 2A C. Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.05, at 16
(4th ed. 1973) ("No single canon of interpretation can purport to give a certain and unerring answer
to the question [of legislative intent].").
67. Rd. § 45.06, at 19 ("Since an intention is a mental state and only individual persons have
minds, only an individual can have an intention. It follows that the idea of a legislative intent must
be regarded as a fiction or a figure of speech.").
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Continental W., Inc., 99 Wash. 2d 555, 663 P.2d 482 (1983) (finding
that individual legislator's intent may only be seen as instructive of Legislature's intent).
69. See supra Part II.B.1.
70. See supra Part II.B.1.
Washington Law Review
abode or, under the Sheldon rule, whether it is the second house of usual
abode. To facilitate a plaintiff's efforts to effectuate service, a court
would be inclined to allow service at either location. However, to ensure
that a defendant receives notice the court would likely restrict service to
the place where the student actually resides. Reference to the purpose of
the statute does not indicate which interpretation a coiut should adopt.
When a statute, such as the substitute service of process statute, has
more than one legislative purpose, courts need guidance in addition to
the instruction to effectuate legislative purpose. That instruction alone
does not tell courts how to weigh the competing interests of plaintiffs
and defendants.7
Instructing courts to effectuate legislative purpose is equally
problematic when the legislature has not indicated how the purpose of a
statute should be fulfilled in a particular situation.72 In this situation, it is
of little assistance to instruct courts to interpret statutes according to the
legislative purpose. When the service of process statute was enacted
shortly before the turn of the century, it is probable that the Washington
Legislature did not envision the simultaneous maintenance of domiciles
in two distant states.73 Because it is unlikely that the Legislature
considered this possibility or how to effect the statute's purpose in such
a case, reference to legislative purpose does not neces;sarily inform a
court's interpretation of the substitute service of process statute.
Finally, under a literal theory of interpretation, use of liberal
interpretation under Sheldon actually may fail to implement the purpose
of the service of process statute. The literal theory of interpretation
contends that the words of the statute are the statement of purpose.74 The
literal theory of interpretation is based on the reasoning that enacted
words are the best indication of the legislature's purpose because they
were agreed upon and adopted through the legislative process.
71. Interestingly, the rule that Washington courts have developed to balance competing interests
under the personal service of process statute recognizes that personal service is preferable while
allowing substantial compliance with personal service requirements to give plaintiff's a reasonable
means to serve defendants. See Thayer v. Edmonds, 8 Wash. App. 36, 503 P.2d 1110 (1972).
72. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 46, at 1480 (noting that some legislation has gaps or
ambiguities about which there was little legislative debate).
73. Although the Legislature may have contemplated separate abodes within the state, given the
means of transportation at the time, the Legislature would scarcely have envisioned simultaneously
residing in cities as distant as Seattle and Chicago.
74. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ('There is, of
course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of
themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation.'.
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Washington courts have accepted this theory to the extent that they
require that statutory construction begin with the words of the statute.75
Under this theory, the purpose of the substitute service of process statute
is effected when "a copy of the summons is left at the defendant's house
of usual abode with a person of suitable age and discretion"76 because
this is the specific language the legislature chose to effectuate its
purpose. A liberal interpretation rule that allows substitute service to
occur at some place other than the usual place of abode departs from the
words of the statute and, under the literal interpretation theory, actually
fails to implement the Legislature's purpose.
In sum, although Sheldon calls for liberal interpretation to effectuate
the legislature's purpose, determining legislative purpose is not a
straightforward task. As an initial matter, statutes are not the product of
a single legislative purpose. Rather, they represent compromises and
negotiations of the legislative process. Statutes also may have numerous,
inconsistent purposes, or there may be no legislative consideration of a
statute's applicability to a particular situation. Finally, if one accepts the
literal interpretation theory that the purpose of any given statute is
contained within the words of the statute itself, Sheldon's liberal
interpretation that allows departure from the words of the statute fails to
implement the Legislature's purpose.
B. The Sheldon Majority's Application of the Liberal Construction
Statute to the Service ofProcess Statute Is Problematic
The applicability and scope of the liberal construction statute,
Revised Code of Washington section 1.12.010, is not settled in
Washington. As an initial matter, the interpretive statute has not been
explicitly found to apply to the service of process statute.77 As a more
general matter, the liberal construction statute has not prevented judicial
reliance on canons of strict construction. Statutes, such as Revised Code
of Washington section 1.12.0 10, that direct judicial construction of code
provisions were typically enacted in reaction to courts resisting the
75. See, e.g., Service Employees Int'l, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 104 Wash.
2d 344,705 P.2d 776 (1985); Graffel v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash. 2d 390, 191 P.2d 858 (1948); State
v. Cameron, 71 Wash. App. 653, 861 P.2d 1069 (1993).
76. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.080(15) (1988).
77. Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 154, 812 P.2d 858, 861 (1991) (finding that
application of liberal construction statute to service of process statute was open to argument).
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codification of issues previously governed by common law.78 In some
states, interpretative statutes specifically abolished the canon that
statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed.79 In
these states, judges are prevented from using the common law to
narrowly interpret statutes.8" In Washington, however, the interpretative
statute has less specific language." Consequently, Washington courts
have continued to apply canons of strict construction in the face of the
liberal construction statute.82 The continued use of canons of strict
construction indicates that there are recognized judicial limits to the
scope of the liberal construction statute.
1. Liberal Construction of a Statute Cannot Add Words to a Statute
Although the scope of the interpretive statute is not settled, generally
courts agree that an interpretive statute calling for liberal construction
may not stretch the meaning of a statute beyond the text itself.83
Washington courts have followed this rule and declared that a court may
not add words to a statute.84 Justice Talmadge argued, in dissent, that the
majority in Sheldon did just that. The majority's holding that a defendant
could have more than one usual house of abode effectively re-wrote the
statute to allow service at 'the house of ... usual abode and one or
more other places where the defendant may be frequently found."' 85 The
dissent argued that the statute's language calling for ,service at "the
house of his usual abode," because it was stated in the singular,
prohibited the possibility of more than one house of usual abode.86
Without adding words to the statute, even liberal interpretation of the
service of process statute could not have produced the rule that a
78. See Alan R. Romero, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 211, 215
(1994) (explaining that courts relied on canons of strict construction to counteract legislative
codifications of common law).
79. See id. at 216 n.24 (referring to Ark., Cal., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Mo., Mont., Neb., Okla., Pa.,
& Utah).
80. See id. at 243.
81. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Martin v. Meier, 111 Wash. 2d 471, 760 P.2d 925 (1988); State ex reL McDonald
v. Whatcom County Dist. Court, 92 Wash. 2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1979); Muncie v. Westcraft Corp.,
58 Wash. 2d 36, 360 P.2d 744 (1961); State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wash. 612, 153
P. 315 (1915); In re Estate of Palucci, 61 Wash. App. 412, 810 P.2d 970 (1991).
83. See cases cited in Romero, supra note 78, at 240-41.
84. See Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wash. 2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535. 536 (1978).
85. Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wash. 2d 601, 617, 919 P.2d 1209, 1216 (1996) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting) (alterations in original).
86. Id at 617, 587 P.2d at 1216 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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defendant may maintain more than one usual house of abode. Sheldon's
holding adds words to the statute and violates the rule that courts may
not stretch the meaning of a statute beyond the words themselves.
2. Sheldon's Rule ofLiberal Interpretation Does Not Provide Clear
Guidelines for the Resolution of Substitute Service ofProcess
Cases
The Sheldon rule calling for liberal construction of the substitute
service of process statute does not give lower courts a reliable guideline
to apply the statute in later cases because the court's use of the term
"liberally construed" is ambiguous. "Liberally construed" could mean
that, after a court applies regular interpretive methods (such as reference
to context, legislative history, and interpretive canons), it must resolve
remaining uncertainties in favor of the statute's purposes. 7 On the other
hand, "liberally construed" could mean that liberal construction should
produce the meaning that best furthers the purposes of the statute. For
example, liberal construction of the substitute service of process statute
under the first reading of the liberal construction statute would lead a
court first to apply the canon that statutes in derogation of common law
should be strictly construed and then to resolve remaining uncertainties
in favor of the statute's purposes. Under the second interpretation, the
court would forego use of interpretive canons or legislative history and
simply refer to the legislative purposes underlying the substitute service
of process statute.88 Application of the substitute service of process
statute under the first interpretation of the liberal construction statute
would necessarily be narrower than it would be under the second
interpretation of the liberal construction statute. Because Sheldon's rule
of interpretation under the liberal construction statute provides courts
with at least two different interpretations and no method of determining
which interpretation to apply, courts are left without a reliable method
for interpreting the substitute service of process statute.
In conclusion, there are a number of problems with liberal
construction as applied to the service of process statute. The first
problem is that the applicability of the liberal construction statute to the
substitute service of process statute has not been clearly established.
Second, even a liberal interpretation of the service of process statute
87. See Romero, supra note 78, at 223-24.
88. As demonstrated supra Part II.A., reference to legislative purpose will not resolve the
question of interpretation when the statute has multiple purposes.
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should not add words to the statute. Finally, the concept of liberal
interpretation is ambiguous and does not provide a clear guideline for
further adjudication. The problem of ambiguity is particularly
troublesome because doubt about the meaning of the statute increases
litigation over the meaning of the statute's terms. 9
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH: THE RULE REQUIRING STRICT
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SUBSTITUTE SERVICE OF
PROCESS STATUTE SHOULD BE RETAINED
A. Washington Canons of Construction Callfor Strict Construction of
the Substitute Service ofProcess Statute
Strict construction of the substitute service of process statute is
consistent with Washington canons of construction and should be
maintained. Washington courts generally abide by the canon that statutes
in derogation of common shall be strictly construed.' Although the
canon has been criticized recently,9" there are valid reasons for the rule.
The primary importance of the canon is that it safeguards the common
law,92 preserving the existing framework of legal rules and the private
expectations that rest on the meaning of legal rules.93 Strict construction
of the substitute service of process statute would affirm he due process
reasons behind the common law rule and justify reliance on existing
legal rules.
In addition to the canon that statutes in derogation of common law
should be strictly construed, three other canons used in Washington
argue for strict construction of the substitute service of :process statute.
89. Cf M. Meredith Hayes, Parker v. Frank Emmet Real Estate: Should Plaintiffs Choice of
Service of Process Method Matter?, 32 Cath. U. L. Rev. 974, 979 (1982-1983).
90. See cases cited supra note 82.
91. See Sheldon, 129 Wash. 2d 601, 919 P.2d 1209; Wichert v. Cardwell. 117 Wash. 2d 148,
812 P.2d 858 (1991); see also Barbara Page, Statues in Derogation of Common Law: The Canon as
an Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 78; Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutory
Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 1 (1992); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken A Good Thing Too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 199 (1996). See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev.
383 (1908).
92. See, e.g., McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
93. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. Rev.
1179, 1198; see also Page, supra note 91, at 81-82 (noting that Wisconsin courts relied on canon
because reliance on common law had created rights and titles and declaring reliance on these as
unjustified because it would cause widespread confusion and uncertainty).
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The first canon is that a statute plainly designed as a substitute for the
common law must be given effect over the common law rule. 4 This rule
implies that a statute that is not a substitute for the common law need
not override the common law rule. The Legislature did not plainly
designate the liberal construction statute as a substitute for the
judicially-developed rule that statutes in derogation of common law
should be strictly construed." Because the liberal construction statute
was not plainly designed as a substitute for that common law rule of
strict interpretation, the statute need not override the common law rule.
Rather, the common law rule should continue to be given effect and,
under the rule of strict construction before Sheldon, it would continue to
be given effect.
A closely related canon supports strict interpretation of the substitute
service statute. This canon states that when a statute and common law
are so repugnant that both cannot be given effect, the statute will be
deemed to abrogate the common law rule.96 This canon obviously would
not apply when the common law rule and the statute can be given effect
simultaneously. The common law canon of strict construction has been
treated as an exception to the liberal construction statute since the statute
was enacted in 1854."7 Because both have been given effect, it cannot be
said that the liberal construction statute abrogated the common law rule
of strict construction. The rule of interpretation before Sheldon
recognized that the common law rule of strict construction was an
exception to the statutory rule and called for a strict reading of the
substitute service of process statute. Liberal interpretation of the
substitute service statute under Sheldon ignores the fact that the statute
and the common law rule have been given effect simultaneously.
Because the common law rule and the statute were reconciled under the
pre-Sheldon interpretation, the earlier interpretation should be retained.
Finally, Washington courts have followed the rule that the Legislature
will not be assumed to have changed the common law unless it has
clearly stated so. The basis for this rule is that a legislature can
reasonably be expected to plainly announce its intention to change
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Madden v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 221, 517 P.2d
585, 587 (1973) (citing United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381 (1899)).
95. See supra Part II.B.2.
96. See, e.g., Madden, 83 Wash. 2d at 222, 517 P.2d at 587 (rejecting argument that common
law rule controls over later statute in derogation of common law).
97. See cases cited supra note 82.
98. See McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
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common law." Accordingly, in an ambiguous statute, such as the liberal
construction statute,re where there is no legislative indication that the
rule that statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly
construed is to be changed, a reading of the statute that closely adheres
to the common law rule of interpretation is appropriate.
Washington canons of construction indicate that the substitute service
of process statute should be strictly construed. Strict consitruction of the
statute safeguards the common law and the expectations built upon
existing legal rules. Strict construction of the statute also is appropriate
because the common law rule of strict construction has not been
replaced by the liberal interpretation statute. In fact, boti can be given
effect under the rule before Sheldon. Finally, strict construction
acknowledges the judicially developed presumption that the legislature
will not change the common law unless it does so explicit[Ly.
B. Strict Construction of the Substitute Service of Process Statute
Better Protects Defendants' Due Process Rights
Strict construction of the service of process statute protects
defendants' procedural due process rights more thoroughly than the
Sheldon rule of interpretation. Any satisfactory rule for interpreting the
service of process statute must protect defendants' due process rights as
fully as possible. "The purpose of statutes which prescribe the methods
of service of process is to provide due process. 'The fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' ... That
opportunity to be heard in turn depends upon notice that a suit is being
commenced..... Although the Sheldon rule of interpretation does not
violate procedural due process per se,"°2 its reliance on purposive
analysis could result in a withdrawal from the fullest protection of
defendants' due process rights. As discussed above, the substitute
service of process statute has multiple purposes that may lead courts to
99. See, e.g., State v. Calderon, 102 Wash. 2d 348, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) (rejecting change of
legislative policy by implication); State v. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983)
(stating presumption that new legislation conformed to common law and prior judicial decisions);
see also Miller, supra note 93, at 1197; cf Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d
948 (1982) (declining to introduce change in statutory language where legislative intent to do so
was not expressed).
100. See supra Part III.B.2.
101. Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 151,812 P.2d 858, 859 (1991) (quoting Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394 (1914)).
102. See Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wash. 2d 601,609, 919 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1996).
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promote plaintiffs' interests over those of defendants. 3 The previous
rule requiring strict adherence to the terms of the statute better protects
defendants' due process rights.
Liberal interpretation of the substitute service of process statute is
twice removed from the ideal method of service and inadequately
protects defendants' due process rights. The substitute service of process
statute originally was developed as an extension of the rule requiring
personal service." Recognizing that substitute service of process
statutes extended beyond the ideal method of personally serving the
defendant, legislatures enacted a specific procedure to ensure that
defendants' due process rights were protected.'0 5 In Wuchter v.
Pizzutti,1°6 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that statutes calling for
service other than personal service must be closely complied with to
support proper service." 7 Washington courts have developed a similar
requirement and have called for careful adherence to statutory service
procedures.' Sheldon's liberal reading of the statute's procedure takes
yet another step away from the preferred method of personal service on
the defendant. As one court noted, "the greater the deviation from
statutory procedures, the greater the likelihood that the respondent's due
process rights have been violated."'0 9 A liberal interpretation of the
substitute service of process statute allows greater deviation from its
provisions and compromises the protection of defendants' due process
rights. By contrast, the rule of strict construction closely follows the
legislatively adopted procedure to protect defendants' due process
rights.
103. See supra Part III.A.
104. See Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 48, 812 P.2d at 858.
105. See, e.g., Podgomy v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 311 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (finding
that Illinois courts required strict compliance with substitute service of process statutory procedure
because legislature deemed enacted procedure commensurate with due process rights).
106. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
107. Id. at 24.
108. See Martin v. Triol, 121 Wash. 2d 135, 847 P.2d 471 (1993) (requiring close adherence to
statutory service of process procedures); Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 152, 812 P.2d at 860 (noting
that method of service must be reasonably calculated to provide notice even though defendant was
not guaranteed to receive actual notice in all cases); Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp.,
82 Wash. 2d 418, 413, 511 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1973) (stating that "[t]he procedural safeguards
afforded in each situation should be tailored to the specific function to be served by them");
McAnulty v. Snohomish Sch. Dist. No. 201, 9 Wash. App. 834, 515 P.2d 523 (1973) (stating that
actual notice could not substitute for adherence to terms of statute). But see City of Spokane v.
Department of Labor & Indus. (In re Saltis), 94 Wash. 2d 889, 621 P.2d 716 (1980) (finding
service sufficient when notice was actually received even though statute was not strictly followed).
109. In re Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Colo. 1988).
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Washington should follow other jurisdictions that require strict
adherence to substitute service of process statutes to protect due process
rights. Although some states require strict compliance with substitute
and constructive service statutes mainly because they are in derogation
of common law,"' other states require strict compliance explicitly on
due process grounds."' Other jurisdictions' strict adherence to the letter
of substitute and constructive service statutes dermonstrates the
importance of compliance with these statutes to uphold defendants' due
process rights. Washington should continue to apply the! rule of strict
construction to protect defendants' due process rights.
Because the Sheldon rule of interpretation relies on purposive
analysis that may not protect defendants' due process rights, the
previous rule of interpretation should be retained. The Sheldon rule of
interpretation actually retreats from the statutory procedures and the
example of other jurisdictions that require strict compliance with
statutory procedures to safeguard defendants' due process rights.
C. Although There Is Merit to Justice Talmadge's Proposed Rule, a
More Thorough Inquiry Is Required Before It Can Be Adopted
The basis of Justice Talmadge's proposed rule indicates that there
should be a stricter standard for notice of commencement of an action
than for notice of an appeal. As discussed above, Justice Talmadge has
proposed that strict compliance with statutes be required when acquiring
original jurisdiction and substantial compliance be required for matters
110. See, e.g., In re Estate of Manley, 226 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Gookin v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992).
111. See, e.g., Kott v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that personal
service is preferred method of service and that strict compliance with substitute and constructive
service statutes is required); Knabb v. Morris, 492 So. 2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
that due process required strict adherence to service of process statute); American Liberty Ins. Co.
v. Maddox, 238 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (adhering to established rule that due process
required strict compliance with service of process statutes); City of Chicago v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank, 523 N.E.2d 1130, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that "strict compliance with the statutory
requirements which protect defendant's rights to due process may not be ignored"); Taylor v.
Landsman, 422 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling according to Illinois law and noting
that "Illinois courts have long required strict adherence to the statutorily prescribed manner for
service of process"); Spearman v. Stover, 170 So. 259 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (finding that full
compliance with constructive service of process statute was indispensable in affording due process
of law to nonresidents); Donnelly v. Carpenter, 9 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (construing
constructive service statute strictly as if it was jurisdictional and instrumental to due process
rights); Wiebusch v. Wiebusch, 636 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that constructive
notice statutes must be strictly complied with to be consistent with requirements of due process).
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of continuing and appellate jurisdiction." 2 In formulating his rule,
Justice Talmadge did not cite any Washington case law that supports the
proposition that statutory provisions for service of notice of appeal need
only be substantially complied with."3 In fact, aside from stating that his
rule would be protective of due process rights, and that it would be less
complicated than the current rule, Justice Talmadge did not thoroughly
explain the basis for his proposed rule. In Vasquez v. Department of
Labor & Industries,"4 Judge McInturff suggested a possible basis for
Justice Talmadge's rule. Judge McInturff asserted that commencement
of an action was different than an appeal because parties to an appeal
have previously been notified of the action and have had the opportunity
to offer their case. Parties to an action being commenced, however, may
have no knowledge of the action until summons is served. It follows that
this difference requires a stricter standard for serving notice to
commence an action than to notice of an appeal."
t 5
The first part of Justice Talmadge's rule, requiring strict compliance
with notice provisions to gain jurisdiction initially, breaks from
precedent. The Washington Supreme Court explained in City of Spokane
v. Department of Labor & Industries (In re Saltis)16 that substantial
112. See supra Part II.C.
113. See, e.g., Saltis, 94 Wash. 2d 889, 896, 621 P.2d 716, 720 (holding that, under Industrial
Insurance Act, service is proper if director of Labor and Industries actually received notice of
appeal or notice of appeal was served in manner reasonably calculated to give notice); O'Neill v.
Jacobs, 77 Wash. App. 366, 890 P.2d 1092 (1995) (finding that service by facsimile substantially
complied with Mandatory Arbitration Rule and granted court jurisdiction over appeal); Petta v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 68 Wash. App. 406, 842 P.2d 1006 (1992) (finding that, under
Industrial Insurance Act, substantial compliance is sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction);
Graves v. Vaagen Bros. Lumber, 55 Wash. App. 908, 781 P.2d 895 (1989) (noting difference
between filing of notice and service of notice and court's general leniency toward compliance with
necessary steps for service invoking appellate jurisdiction); State v. Sorenson, 2 Wash. App. 97,
466 P.2d 532 (1970) (concluding that filing of defendant's appeal bond substantially complied with
required content of notice of appeal and was sufficient).
114. 44 Wash. App. 379, 722 P.2d 854 (finding that substantial compliance with procedural
rules under Industrial Insurance Act was sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction of superior
court).
115. Id. at 387-88, 722 P.2d at 859-60 (Mcnturff, J., concurring).
116. 94 Wash. 2d 889, 621 P.2d 716. The issue in Saltis was whether, under the Industrial
Insurance Act, service was sufficient when there was no proof that service had been made upon the
director of Labor and Industries. Ra. at 892, 621 P.2d at 717-18. The Industrial Insurance Act
states: "[A] worker, beneficiary, employer or other person aggrieved by the [board] decision may
appeal to the superior court.... mhe appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court
a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the
board." Wash. Rev. Code § 51.52.110 (1990). The court held that service was proper when the
director received actual notice of appeal or when notice of appeal was served in a manner
reasonably calculated to give notice. Saltis, 94 Wash. 2d at 896, 621 P.2d at 720.
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compliance with service of process statutes is sufficient even to obtain
initial jurisdiction because delay or the possibility of losing lawsuits
should not result from complicated procedural technicalities." 7 Based on
this policy, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
first portion of Justice Talmadge's proposed rule.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to consider fully the
ramifications of accepting Justice Talmadge's proposed rule, at first
glance, Judge McInturff's explanation provides a compelling argument
for applying a different standard to acquisition of initial jurisdiction than
to acquisition of appellate jurisdiction. Applying a different standard,
however, would be a considerable change in Washington law and would
require further examination. Similarly, adoption of Justice Talmadge's
proposal for strict compliance to gain initial jurisdiction would overrule
established case law and possibly frustrate the policy to avoid loss of
lawsuits on procedural grounds. Such a proposal with potentially far-
reaching consequences should not be adopted without a more thorough
consideration than can be afforded here.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule that substitute service of process statutes should be strictly
interpreted should be retained for three reasons. First, strict compliance
with substitute service of process statutes protects defendants' due
process interests. There is a strong public policy interest in seeing that
defendants receive notice of actions against them so that they may have
their day in court in accordance with due process requirements. Second,
although there is no vested legal interest in statutes and common law
remaining the same, it is equitable to maintain private expectations that
rest on the meaning of the rules. A strict reading safeguards the
expectations that are based on common law and subsequ.ent legal rules.
Finally, Sheldon's rule of liberal construction to effectuate the purpose
of the statute provides a vague standard for lower courls and litigants.
Strict construction provides a clearer guideline that would bring
coherence to Washington's confused service of process jurisprudence
and provide litigants with certainty when serving process. This certainty
in turn would create less litigation over service of process sufficiency.
117. Saltis, 94 Wash. 2d at 895-96, 621 P.2d at 719.
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